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MIRANDA IN A JUVENILE SETTING: A
CHILD'S RIGHT TO SILENCE*
Larry E. Holtz**
I.

THE SETrING

Fourteen year old S.D. was arrested by police for the armed robbery of a local grocery store. Immediately after the arrest, he was
taken to police headquarters and, after being read the Miranda warnings from the standard form, subjected to custodial interrogation.
Within minutes, S.D. confessed to the robbery.
The juvenile court judge permitted the arresting officer to testify
as to the content of the juvenile's confession, finding that the police
questioning was conducted in accordance with the highest standards
of due process and fundamental fairness. Additionally, the judge
found that the procedural requirements of Miranda were met. S.D.
was adjudged delinquent upon a finding that he robbed the grocery
store while brandishing a loaded .38 caliber revolver; this crime, if
committed by an adult, would constitute first degree robbery.
On appeal, S.D. contends that the confession should have been
excluded from his delinquency hearing because he did not understand
the Miranda warnings. He further asserts that the police officer merely
read him the warnings from a standardized adult Miranda card and
made no attempt to explain the warnings in language he could
understand.
Hypothetical
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not specifically
held the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda I applicable to
the juvenile justice system. The issue this article addresses is: if a
law enforcement officer must administer the Miranda warnings to a
youth suspect prior to any custodial interrogation, must that officer
modify those warnings so that their administration takes on a form
* The author wishes to acknowledge his sincere appreciation to Professor Marina
Angel of Temple University School of Law for her guidance, comments, and helpful
criticisms throughout the draft of this article and Northfield, New Jersey Defense
Attorney, D. William Subin, for his tenacious critique and invaluable insight.
** J.D. projected for 1988, Temple University School of Law; B.A., Temple University, 1984. Police Detective, Atlantic City Police Department, New Jersey; Certified Police Instructor for the State of New Jersey; Adjunct Professor of Law Enforcement,
Atlantic Community College.
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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comprehensible to the youth, and, if so, how should the officer modify such warnings?
The foundation supporting the American juvenile justice system is "rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in corpus
juris."2 In theory, the mission of the juvenile court is to ascertain the
needs of the child while, at the same time, balancing the necessity
for societal protection. Instead of acting as prosecutor and judge,
the juvenile court officials take on the role of parens patriae.3 This
approach theoretically adds a more therapeutic-counseling atmosphere to juvenile hearings than does the more traditional adversarial environment of adult criminal trials. In fact, juvenile court
officials possess greater discretion to use the law in numerous ways
not generally available in other forums. As one commentator
stated:
For them, law is not merely a code of conduct that children must be
made to obey; it is a code whose violation is taken as symptomatic of
an interior disorder and used to identify those children to be taken
into custody and 'helped'. The discovery
of a violation represents an
4
opportunity to teach new lessons.
Acting as parenspatriae, the juvenile court proceeds with a general program for the best interests of the youth while balancing the
general interests of the community at large. In this respect, the
child is not "considered an enemy of society but society's child who
needs understanding, guidance and protection. The goals of the
program are rehabilitation and protection from the social conditions
that lead to crime." 5 Accordingly, the issues faced by the juvenile
court are not criminal culpability, determinations of guilt or innocence, and punishment, but are instead sensitivity, understanding,
6
guidance, and protection.
In the majority of cases, a law enforcement official refers the
youth offender to the juvenile court. 7 Therefore, the youth's first
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
This latin term literally means "parent of the country," signifying the role a state
takes as the guardian of persons who are under some form of legal disability. In this
context, the disability concerns those persons under the age of 18.
4 NoteJuvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and IndividualizedJustice, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 775, 804 (1966).
5 Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form1,
1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 10.
2
3

6 Id.
7 See supra note 4, at 776 n.5, for statistics showing that over 987o of the Chicago
juvenile court cases were referred by law enforcement agencies. Judge Steven Perskie of
the Atlantic County, New Jersey Superior Court recently stated that the amount of law
enforcement referrals in the Southern NewJersey area in 1985, 1986 and early 1987 was
probably even higher than the 98% reported for the Chicago area.
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contact with the juvenile justice system is achieved through some
sort of interaction with the police (or juvenile) officer in the field. If
the contact necessitates taking the youth into custody," the formal
procedural requirements of the juvenile justice system are invoked. 9
Thus, from initial contact to formal invocation of juvenile procedure, the law enforcement official plays a vital role in the path the
youth will take.
It is this "vital role" which mandates the extrapolation of the
juvenile court's perceptions of "understanding, guidance, and protection" back to the moment of initial law enforcement intervention.
Should the intervention necessitate taking the youth into custody,
these perceptions should require at least the same procedural safeguards afforded persons in similar and parallel stages of adult investigation. As one commentator writes, "even greater protection
might be required where juveniles are involved, since their immaturity and greater vulnerability place them at a greater disadvantage
in their dealings with the police." 1 0
While it is arguable that some juveniles experienced in the "sys8 Personal experience indicates that many police contacts merely end with a warning
to the juvenile and transportation home to his or her parents or guardian without any
formal or offical record made of the contact, other than a brief entry in the communications log and the officer's vehicle log. The field-officer may, however, write up an informal "field-interview card" about the contact and, after transporting the youth home,
deliver the card to the department's juvenile division.
9 For example, in Atlantic City, when a juvenile is taken into custody following his
alleged commission of a crime, the juvenile detective must immediately contact thejuvenile's parents or guardian. If contact is not immediately made, the officer must formally
document the time and place of each contact attempt. The officer must also contact the
Atlantic County Juvenile Intake Office, where on-call superior court staff personnel are
informed of the circumstances of the instant case and thejuvenile's record and make a
determination as to whether the child should be placed in ajuvenile detention center, a
JINS (Juvenile in Need of Supervision) facility, or released into parental custody. If the
Intake Office official determines that detention in a juvenile facility is warranted, the
officer must execute a formal written request for detention and delineate the reasons for
the detention therein. The officer then prepares a formal juvenile "petition," which is
the charging instrument, and attaches to it the relevant custody and investigation reports. Next, he formally logs the time-in, time-out, and the destination location and,
finally personally escorts the juvenile to one of the twenty-one available juvenile facilities. Interview withJames Kelly, Atlantic City PoliceJuvenile Detective, in Atlantic City,
NewJersey (March 15, 1987).
10 Grisso,Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 68 CALIF.
L. REV. 1134, 1137 (1980) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967), in which Justice
Fortas in his discussion of juvenile admissions stated: "[T]he greatest care must be
taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not
coerced or suggested, but that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or dispair.") See also State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373 (Me. 1982)(in
which Justice Carter of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated: "[C]ourts should
never lose sight of the fact that ajuvenile's vulnerability and immaturity places him at a
greater disadvantage than an adult when dealing with the police." Id. at 377).
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tem" have the ability to fend for themselves when questioned by a
police official, most youths lack the proper faculties to comprehend
the official inquiry or foresee the path down which it may lead."
This problem of juvenile comprehension has been highlighted in
empirical studies which focus on the ability of juveniles to under12
stand and waive their Miranda rights.
Miranda 13 specifically discusses "the admissibility of statements
obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial interrogation 14 and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself." 15 In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the five-member majority,
established "concrete consitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow." 16 The majority fashioned the guidelines into specific procedural requirements which must be adhered
to before any statements made by an individual during custodial interrogation may be used against him.
[U]nless other fully effective means are devised to inform persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, pro11 A question naturally arises as to whether the majority of adult laymen have the
ability to stand on equal footing with a questioning law enforcement official. A 1967
Yale study of draft protesters indicated that even highly intelligent, well-educated, and
extremely willful suspects-twenty-one Yale faculty and staff members and studentswho were advised of their rights by FBI agents in their own homes or offices failed to
understand the nature and function of the constitutional rights at stake and could not
"turn off" their "interviewers" even when they indicated that they did not want to be
questioned. Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft
Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967). Accord Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of
Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968). See also infra note 41 and accompanying text.
12 See Grisso, supra note 10, at 1134 (arguing that doubts surrounding a youth's ability to comprehend the Mirandawarnings are fortified "by the fact that despite receiving
the warnings, most juveniles in pretrial proceedings waive rather than invoke their
rights"); Grisso & Pomicter, InterrogationofJuveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures,Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, I L. & HUM. BEHAv. 321 (1977)(discussing a study of a large
random sample ofjuvenile arrests for alleged felonies in which approximately 10% of
the juveniles informed of their Miranda rights chose not to waive them). See also
Furguson & Douglas, A Study ofJuvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 39 (1970).
13 384 U.S. 436.
14 "Custodial interrogation" is defined by the Court as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 439.
16 Id. at 432.
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vided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be
no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner and at any stage of the process that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he
may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has1consulted
with an attorney and there7
after consents to be questioned.

By means of the above procedural safeguards, the Court sought to
rectify the evils of "incommunicado interrogation" in a coercive
"police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights."' 18 The safeguards, as a prophylactic device, were intended to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings and ensure that any

statement obtained by police questioning is truly a product of free
choice. 19

In its discussion of the fifth amendment, the Court "readily perceive[s] an intimate connection between the privilege against selfincrimination and police custodial questioning" 20 and concludes
that "the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed
the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." 2 1 Accordingly, the privilege was

held to be fully applicable during periods of police custodial interrogation. 2 2 Further, Chief Justice Warren emphatically stated:
There can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside of criminal court proceedingsand serves to protectpersons in allsettings in
which their freedom of action is curtailed in2 3any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves.
17 Id. at 444-45.
18 Id. at 445.
19 Id. at 458. See also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)(both recognizing the prophylactic nature of the Miranda
warnings).
20 384 U.S. at 458.
21 Id. at 460 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)(fifth amendment privilege
to be free from self-incrimination is, by reason of the fourteenth amendment, fully applicable to the states).
22 Id. at 461. The Court further observed that "all the principles embodied in the
privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers during incustody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces and subjected to [inherently coercive] techniques of persuasion... cannot be otherwise than under a compulsion to speak. As a
practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may
well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery." Id. at 461.
23 Id. at 467 (emphasis added). See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
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Within one year following the Miranda decision, the Court decided In re Gault,24 in which Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority,
determined that "the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to
adults."' 2 5 Although the Court briefly mentioned Miranda in this juvenile adjudicatory setting, 26 the question necessarily arises whether
such a reference is misplaced. The Court specifically limited its
holding to adjudicatory proceedings before a juvenile court. 27 Furthermore, there was no admission on the record elicited by police
custodial interrogation. Rather, the admissions at issue were elicited and relied upon by the juvenile court itself.28 Nonetheless, Justice Fortas stated:
[Tjheprivilege againstself-incrimination is, of course related to the question of
the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are
reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth .... It would indeed
were available
be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination
29
to hardened criminals but not to children.
As a result, Gault may, on the one hand, be interpreted as delivering no constitutional precedent on the applicability of Miranda to
pre-adjudicatory police-juvenile custodial interrogation. On the
other hand, the citation to Mirandain reference to the juvenile court
may have been purposely included; it may very well be a harbinger
to the lower courts suggesting one of the factors to be considered
when a court is determining whether a juvenile's admissions which
resulted from custodial police interrogation should be admitted in a
delinquency proceeding with the consequence that the youth may
be committed to a correctional institution.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)(recognizing children as "persons" under the United
States Constitution). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)(in
which the Court noted that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of maturity.").
24 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25 Id. at 55.
26 See id. at 44.
27 Id. at 13, 22 n.30 ("We consider only the problems presented by this case. These
relate to proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a
delinquent as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he
may be committed to a state institution." Id. at 13.).
28 Here, the Court observed that while no alleged admissions made by the defendant
to the probation officer appeared in the record, that record did contain admissions made
by him to the juvenile courtjudge. As a result, the Court stated: "We shall assume that
[the defendant] made [the] admissions [at issue to the juvenile court judge]." Yd.at 43.
29 Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
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THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE

In West v. United States,30 the sixteen-year-old appellant urged
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to "extend" Gault and
hold that "the pre-interrogation warnings commanded in all criminal cases by Miranda also apply to pre-judicial stages of federal juvenile delinquency proceedings.' 1 Although the court found it
unnecessary to decide this issue due to the arresting officer's administration of all the Miranda requirements, 32 its use of the word "extend" suggests the conclusion that to so hold would require
extrapolation of the Gault Court's application of the fifth amendment privilege back to the moment of police custodial
33
interrogation.
Conversely, many jurisdictions do not approach the issue as requiring an "extension" of Gault, but construe Gault as mandating the
administration of the Miranda warnings in pre-adjudicatory juvenile
settings through rationales which impel
the inescapable conclusion ... that Gault requires that in a hearing to
determine whether a juvenile has committed an offense for which he
may be confined in a correctional institution, admissions made by the
juvenile during in-custody questioning may not be introduced in evidence unless it is first shown that the Miranda warnings were given,
34
and the privilege against self-incrimination was intelligently waived.
With similar reasoning, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in
Leach v. State,3 5 interpreted Gault as requiring appellate courts to
"regard appeals in juvenile cases more strictly in a case where delinquency proceedings may lead to commitment in a state institution."' 36 In Leach, a probation officer interrogated a twelve-year-old
girl without an attorney present and without the administration of
the Miranda warnings. Although a question arose whether this juvenile could understand the warnings even if given, the court nonethe30

399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969).

31 Id. at 468.
32 Id. at 468 n.6. The court,.in a narrow holding, decided only that ajuvenile's confession obtained outside the presence of his or her parents is not per se inadmissible.
Rather, a juvenile's waiver of his Miranda rights will be assessed by the "totality of the
circumstances" to determine whether it was truly voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 469.
33 Cf Comment,Juvenile Miranda Waiver, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 704, 710 (1975) (interpreting
Gault as providing no constitutional basis for procedures or rights applicable to prejudicial stages of the juvenile process).
34 In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49-51 (D.C. 1968)(presenting a situation in which the investigating police detective failed to administer the Miranda warnings prior to engaging in
custodial interrogation of the juvenile suspect. The court reasoned that "[s]ince Gaul!
makes the Miranda rules applicable to the Juvenile Court, and appellant's Miranda rights
were clearly violated here, the judgment of the Juvenile Court must be reversed.").
35 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
36 Id. at 819.
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less held, on due process grounds, that the failure to warn the
37
juvenile of her Miranda rights warranted reversal.
Other jurisdictions focus on thejuvenile's age, education, intelligence, and experience to determine whether the juvenile's admissions were truly voluntary. In State v. R. W.,3 8 the Appellate Division
of the New Jersey Superior Court was presented with an appeal
challenging the adjudication of delinquency of twelve-year-old R.W.
for possession of stolen property. The public defender asserted that
the confession relied upon by the juvenile court was improperly admitted because the police detective failed to administer all the Miranda warnings by not advising the youth of his right to a court
appointed attorney if he were an indigent. Holding the confession
39
admissible on a due process and fundamental fairness standard,
the court pointed out that, even if each of the Miranda warnings had
been perfectly administered, "this boy did not have the age, mentality, schooling (he was in the third grade) or experience to understand them well enough to knowingly and intelligently choose
whether or not to talk or ask for a lawyer." 40 Judge Gaulkin further
noted:
Juvenile courts deal with children as young as eight. Children of
tender years may understand each word of the Miranda warnings when
plainly and clearly given; they may have street or movie knowledge
about the right to keep silent and to demand a 'mouthpiece,' but nevertheless, up to a certain age
they cannot be deemed to be able to
4
waive the Miranda privileges. '
37 Id. at 821. Also contributing to the court's decision to reverse was the fact that the
probation officer made no attempt to provide the juvenile with counsel to safeguard her
rights. Id. Otherjurisdictions have interpreted Gault as mandating the administration of
the Mirandawarnings in the pre-adjudicatory stages of the juvenile proceeding. See generally Ball v. Ricketts, 779 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1985); In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450
P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); In re Teters, 264 Cal. App. 2d 816, 70 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1968); State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295 (N.H. 1985); In re Meyers, 25 N.C. App. 555, 214
S.E.2d 268 (1975). Cf. State v. Tim S., 41 Wash. App. 60, 701 P.2d 1120 (1985)(admissions from custodial interrogation ofjuvenile without administration of Miranda are only
available to impeach prior inconsistent statement so long as admissions were made without coercion and are trustworthy).
38 115 NJ. Super. 286, 279 A.2d 709 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd mem., 60 NJ. 118, 293
A.2d 182 (1972).
39 Id. at 301, 279 A.2d at 717. The court upheld the admissibility of the confession
finding that there was absolutely no claim of "threats, force, prolonged interrogation or
improper means or influence exerted on the boy, or that the confession was untrue." Id.
at 288, 279 A.2d at 710. "[The test is due process and fundamental fairness and the
giving of the Miranda warnings is not an absolute necessity in every case but an important element in determining whether the admission was truly voluntary." Id. at 301, 279
A.2d at 717. Here, the confession was voluntary and was obtained with "due process
and fundamental fairness." Id. at 301, 279 A.2d at 717, 718.
40 Id. at 713.
41 Id. See also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (a juvenile cannot be
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Although the court in R. W. did acknowledge in its discussion of
Gault that pre-adjudicatory admissions were not at issue, it nonetheless cautioned the New Jersey courts:
[A]lthough Gault ...probably made it necessary to give juveniles (and
their parents, if present) the Miranda warnings, we think that, at least
with reference to pre-adjudicatory interrogation, it does not fasten
upon the juvenile court all of the automatic and mechanical results of
42
noncompliance with Miranda which follow in the criminal courts.

Accordingly, the court concluded with an instruction to law enforce-

ment officials that, if the youth's parents or guardian cannot or will
not come to his side, "the warnings should be given anyway, as a practical matter against the possibility that the youth might understand
43
them and act upon them."

The appellate division's rationale in R. W was approved by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State in Interest of S.H.44 In S.H., a
juvenile delinquency complaint charged that ten-year-old S.H.
caused the drowning death of his six-year-old playmate by pushing
him into a canal. When S.H. was brought to the police station, his
father was already there. Before the police officials conducted any
questioning of S.H., however, they sent Mr. H. home. Then, after
reading and fully explaining the Miranda warnings, the officers procompared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of consequences of his admissions); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948)(noting that a child
is an easy victim of the law and cannot be judged by more exacting standards of maturity). Cf.Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (the Court, in a case involving a child's
right to an abortion, explained that "immature minors often lack the ability to make
fully informed choices that take into account both immediate and long-range consequences."). This author believes, however, that, as the age of the youth approaches
majority, the juvenile-adult distinction for purposes of Miranda become nothing but a
legal fiction. In over eight years of police investigations, this author encountered few
adults who truly comprehended the nature and significance of their rights. Many demanded the rights as they were accustomed to hearing on television, but few truly listened. This observation has been confirmed by Temple University Professor Marina
Angel and Northfield Defense Attorney and former police legal advisor D. William Subin, who both question whether the majority of adult laymen have the sufficient faculties
to make an informed and intelligent decision to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. As Judge Gaulkin explained in R. TV., choosing to waive the privilege necessarily
involves "an understanding of the charge, the possible defenses, the nature of the evidence against the defendant and how it was obtained, the presumption of innocence, the
burden of proof, etc., which only those trained in crime or law possess." 115 NJ. Super.
at 293, 279 A.2d at 713. See also State v. Michael L., 441 A.2d 684, 690 (Me.
1982) (Carter, J., dissenting)(questioning whether the deficient mental or intellectual capabilities of an adult raises doubts as to the adult's understanding of the Miranda
warnings).
42 R.W, 115 N.J. Super. at 295-96, 279 A.2d at 714.
43 Id. (emphasis added).

44 61 NJ. 108, 293 A.2d 181 (1972).
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ceeded to interrogate S.H. for 90 mintues, leading to S.H.'s
confession.
In addition to holding the confession invalid due to the coercive
tactics, Justice Proctor, speaking for a unanimous court, observed
generally that the administration of Miranda warnings to a ten-yearold "even when they are explained is undoubtedly meaningless.
Such a boy certainly lacks the capability to fully understand the
meaning of his rights. Thus, he cannot make a knowing and intelli45
gent waiver of something he cannot understand."
As a result, when R. W. and S.H. are considered as a unit, law
enforcement officials are instructed that, "if the child is not old
enough to understand and waive, and the parents cannot be found
or cannot or will not attend," 4 6 "...
the questioning may go forward, even if it is obvious the [child] does not understand his rights
if the questioning is conducted with the utmost fairness and in accordance with the highest standards of due process and fundamen'4 7
tal fairness."
The New Jersey Supreme Court, nevertheless, did caution the
police officials in S.H. that sending Mr. H. away prior to their questioning of the boy, coupled with their ninety minute custodial interrogation, represented an offensive practice that would not be
48
tolerated in the future.
State in Interest of J.P.B.49 presents a set of circumstances in
which a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based upon a confession obtained without administration of the Miranda warnings. The
offense was of such a degree that it is likely that the juvenile would
have been committed to a correctional institution. This juvenile, in
contrast to ten-year-old S.H. or twelve-year-old R.W., was over seventeen years old. Additionally, the confession inJ.P.B., as in S.H.,
was the product of seemingly coercive custodial interrogation. 50 As
45 Id. at 115, 293 A.2d at 184-85. It was ultimately held that the remaining evidence
was sufficient to establish delinquency, but insufficient to establish murder.
46 R.W., 115 NJ. Super. at 296, 279 A.2d at 714.
47 S.H., 61 NJ. at 115, 293 A.2d at 185. The court also approved the instruction in
R. TV, that "[u]nless the case clearly appears to be one which will be transferred to the
criminal courts, we do not think counsel must be assigned at this point simply because
the parents cannot be present, although it is always desirable to have counsel present if
one is readily available." 115 N.J. Super. at 296, 279 A.2d at 714.
48 S.H., 61 NJ. at 115, 293 A.2d at 184-85.
49 143 N.J. Super. 96, 362 A.2d 1183 (1976).
50 J.P.B. was committed to the Highfields Residential Group Center which is a state
institution to which juveniles are committed as a condition of probation upon an adjudication of delinquency. As part of the program, he was required to participate in discussions with state staff personnel. Participants are encouraged to "bare their souls," that
is, to reveal all prior antisocial activity, including criminal acts. It is understood that a
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a result, the court held "on Miranda grounds" that the confession
obtained "was not properly admissible in his trial for juvenile
51
delinquency.Therefore, the test in New Jersey to determine the admissibility
of a juvenile confession is "due process and fundamental fairness." 52 The administration of Miranda warnings is strongly ad-

vised, but an absence of these warnings will not automatically and
mechanically exclude admissions or confessions obtained. Administration of the warnings, however, remains an important element in
the totality-of-the-circumstances determination of whether an admission is truly voluntary, 53 not only in the sense that it is not a
product of police overreaching, 54 but also in the sense that any
waiver of Miranda is truly a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment
of a known constitutional right. Moreover, as the age of the juvenile
offender approaches majority, 5 5 and his intelligence, level of education, and experiences increase, 5 6 failure to administer the Miranda
warnings coupled with the slightest hint of official coercion will most
likely cause any admissions to be excluded from a delinquency proceeding which could result in the juvenile being committed to a correctional institution.
III.

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Legislatures of numerous jurisdictions have responded to Mifailure to participate results in undesirable sanctions. The confession at issue derived
from one of these "group" sessions which was devoted entirely to J.P.B. The court
determined that the session constituted "custodial interrogation" conducted by "state
officials." Id. at 101, 104, 362 A.2d at 1186, 1188.
51 See id. at 104, 362 A.2d at 1188.
52 Accord Rone v. Wyrick, 764 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1985); West v. United States, 399
F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968).
53 See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)(in which the Court delineated the
following factors relevant to the determination of whether a juvenile has waived his or
her rights: (1) age; (2) level of education; (3) knowledge as to the substance of the
charge, if any has been filed; (4) whether he or she was given Miranda warnings;
(5) whether he or she was held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives,
friends, or an attorney; (6) whether the questioning occurred before or after the initiation of formal charges; and (7) the methods used in, and length of, the interrogation. Cf.
State v. Tim S., 41 Wash. App. 60, 701 P.2d 1120 (1985)(in which the court remanded
the case for a determination of whether the child's admissions were voluntary for impeachment purposes despite the Miranda warnings); State v. Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 256,
463 P.2d 640 (1970); West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968).
54 In S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181, the Mirandawarnings were given and explained
fully for over ten minutes. However, the coercive and overbearing interrogation by the
police was fatal to the admissibility of the confession.
55 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
56 See also Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967); Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass.
224, 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972).
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randa and Gault by implementing new, and revamping old, legislative schemes for the administration ofjuvenile justice. In particular,
many enactments now require the administration of Miranda-type
warnings to juveniles in custody. 5 7 For federal prosecutions, and as
a model for the states, the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 197458 is demonstrative. The history of the legislation 59 shows that Congress found that it was
necessary to amend the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act to guarantee
certain basic procedural and constitutional protections to juveniles
under Federal jurisdiction. The Committee believes that the Act
should provide for the unique characteristics of a juvenile proceeding
and the constitutional safeguards fundamental to our system ofjustice.
Six years after the Supreme Court in In re Gault decried the lack of
certain due process protections in juvenile proceedings, the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act has not changed to reflect those due process
rights.... [S]ince the Federal code is often considered a model for
state statutes... [p]erhaps the... Act can exercise an important influence on state and local progress toward a higher standard of juvenile
justice. 60

The resulting amendment, section 503 of the 1974 Act, provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever ajuvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act ofjuvenile
delinquency, the arrestingofficer shall immediately advise such juvenile of his
legal rights, in language comprehensive to ajuvenile, and shall immediately

notify the Attorney General and the juvenile's parents, guardian, or
custodian of such custody. The arresting officer shall also notify the
parents, guardian, or custodian of the rights of the juvenile and of the
nature of the alleged offense. 6 1
Subsequent judicial interpretations of the above provision and
its legislative history suggest that the Act is "intended to guarantee
the basic procedural and constitutional protections to juveniles
under federal jurisdiction, as mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in
' '6 2
In re Gault.
Thus, while the FederalJuvenile Delinquency Act, as enacted in
June of 1948, contained no provision for the admonition to the juvenile (or his parents) of his rights by the arresting officer, 6 3 the
57 See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
58 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1974).
59 S. REP. No. 93-1011, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5023.
60 Id. at 5312.
61 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1974)(emphasis added).
62 United States v. White Bear, 668 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1982)(emphasis added).
See also United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1977).
63 The predecessor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1974), provided in pertinent part:
Whenever a juvenile is arrested for an alleged violation of any law of the United
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addition of this provision in 1974 not only provided implicit recognition of the rights accorded juveniles by the United States Supreme
Court in Gault, but expressly extrapolated those rights back to the
moment of initial law enforcement intervention.
Numerous states have also enacted statutory provisions similar
to the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974. Illustrative in this regard is § 7A-595 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to
questioning:
(1) That he has the right to remain silent; and
(2) That any statement he does make can be and may be
used against him; and
(3) That he has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; 64 and
(4) That he has a right to consult with an attorney and
that one will be appointed for him if he is not represented and wants representation.
(d) If the juvenile indicates in any manner and at any stage of
questioning pursuant to this section that he does not wish
to be questioned further, the officer shall cease
questioning.
IV.

65

THE NECESSITY OF MODIFICATION

Assuming that Miranda warnings should, as a matter of course,
States, the arresting officer shall immediately notify the Attorney General. If the
juvenile is not forthwith taken before a committing magistrate, he may be detained
in such juvenile home ... to insure his safety or that of others.
64 This particular provision is usually absent from the statutes of the majority of
jurisdictions.
65 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-595 (1979). This section has been construed as prescribing
mandatory procedures which must be followed prior to any questioning. The failure of
law enforcement officials to comply with its provisions results in the inadmissibility of
any statement so obtained. In re Riley, 61 N.C. App. 749, 301 S.E.2d 750 (1983). For
similar statutory provisions, see CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 625, 627.5 (Deering 1967);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(i) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2002(b) (1973); N.D.
CEN-r. CODE § 27-20-27(2) (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-227 (1973). Cf. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4A-40 (West Supp. 1983)("AlI rights guaranteed to criminal defendants by
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this State, except the right
to indictment, the right to trial by jury and the right to bail, shall be applicable to cases
arising under this Uuvenile Justice] Code." This provision has been construed as paralleling the NewJersey judiciary's implicit recognition of the rights accorded juveniles by
the United States Supreme Court in Gault. State in Interest of R.P., 198 N.J. Super. 105,
108, 486 A.2d 873, 876 (App. Div. 1984).
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be administered by law enforcement officers prior to any questioning of juveniles in custody, 6 6 a question necessarily arises whether
the officer must modify those warnings to make their administration
comprehensible to the youth.
In 1969, the California Supreme Court in In re Dennis M. 67
mixed the rationales of Miranda and In re Gault to conclude that juvenile admissions may not be admitted into evidence unless the prosecution meets its burden of establishing at trial that full and complete
Miranda warnings were given. 6 8 Justice Mosk, speaking for the
court, was adamant about the necessity of the warnings and further
stated that "a police officer's conclusory testimony that he gave the
questionee advice 'per accordance with the Miranda decision' is inadequate to discharge such burden." 6 9 Rather, the requirement of
"full and complete warnings" 70 in the context ofjuvenile interrogation means not only that the law enforcement officer advise the
youth of the full panoply of rights as delineated in Miranda, but also
that those rights must be given in terms the youth can comprehend.
Accordingly, Justice Mosk provided California peace officers with
the following recommendation:
To avoid future conflicts on this issue, we recommend that juvenile
officers and police be prepared to give their compulsory Mirandawarnings in terms
that reflect the language and experience of today's
7
juveniles. '
In June of 1980, the United States Department of Justice received the Report of the National Committee forJuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention.7 2 The Report 73 contains the "Standards for the
66 See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)(in which the Supreme Court "assumed without deciding that the Miranda warnings apply to pre-adjudicatory custodial
interrogation of minors in order to decide whether the warnings given by the officials
were voluntarily and knowingly waived by a sixteen-and-a-half-year-oldjuvenile prior to
his questioning concerning the circumstances surrounding a Van Nuys, California
murder.").
67 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
68 Id. at 462, 450 P.2d at 306, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (construing Miranda, 384 U.S. at
479).
69 Id. When the trial court asked the officer to paraphrase from memory the warnings given, it became apparent that the officer failed to mention the required warning
that anything the youth said could and would be used against him in court. Id. at 462,
450 P.2d at 306, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
70 The "full and complete" requirement was held fulfilled due not only to the fact
that a deputy district attorney supplemented the officer's Miranda administration, but
particularly because the youth's attorney failed to pose a timely and appropriate objection to the officer's testimony at trial. Id.
71 Id. at 480 n.13, 450 P.2d at 308 n.13, 75 Cal. Rptr. at n.13.
72 Standards for the Administration ofJuvenile Justice, Report of the NationalAdvisoly
Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1980) [hereinafter Report]. The
Committee "consists of twenty-one members appointed by the President to four-year
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Administration of Juvenile Justice" and is prepared in accordance
with the provisions of § 247 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act.7 4 At § 2.247 of the Report, entitled "Procedures
Applicable to the Interrogation of Juveniles," 75 the National Advisory Committee recommends not only that Miranda warnings be administered to juveniles in custody, but also that officials not
question such juveniles, nor accept any formal oral or written statements, unless the full panoply of Miranda warnings have been administered and "explained in language understandable by the
juvenile, '7 6 taking into account his or her intellect and maturity.
In 1982, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in State v. Nicholas
S. 77 reversed a district court's 78 denial of ajuvenile's motion to suppress his confession due to the inadequate administration of the Miranda warnings by the investigating officers. Although the testimony
indicated that one officer read the fourteen-year-old the warnings
from the standard Miranda card while the other officer attempted to
elaborate upon them, when the juvenile court judge asked the officer to specify the extent of the elaboration, the officer was unable
to recall the words used, "beyond the conclusory statement that [he]
did elaborate upon the standard Miranda reading."'7 9 The Supreme
Judicial Court admonished the officers' actions, stating:
Law enforcement officials would be well advised to fully explain the
rights enunciated in the Miranda warning when dealing with juvenile
offenders in order
to assure adequate comprehension of these impor80
tant safeguards.
terms, and included individuals with special knowledge of delinquency prevention and
treatment, the administration ofjuvenile justice, school violence, vandalism, or learning
disabilities, as well as representatives of private voluntary organizations and community
based programs." Id. at ix.
73 The Report, as a reflection of the basic principles and policies of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, see infra note 73, offers specific strategies, criteria
and approaches that can be used in accomplishing some of the important objectives of
the Act.
74 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1978).
75 Report, supra note 71, at 213.
76 Id.
77 444 A.2d 373 (Me. 1982).
78 The district court sat as a juvenile court for the adjudicatory hearing.
79 Id. at 378.
80 Id. The court held the confession inadmissible and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in which the confession would be excluded. The factors
which entered into the court's finding of an invalid waiver included: (I) the absence in
the record indicating how the officers elaborated upon the formal Miranda warnings;
(2) the failure of the officers to give the "fifth" Afiranda warning, that is, to inform the
accused of his or her right to terminate questioning at any time; (3) the failure to
readminister the Mfiranda warnings when the interrogation was resumed following a long
interruption; (4) the fact that the officers focused their remarks to thejuvenile's mother
who, in turn, told the juvenile to "tell the police the truth"; (5) the juvenile's limited
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In 1985, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in State -0. Benoit 8 l
created a presumption of inadequate explanation of Miranda rights
in finding that the juvenile defendant was "not given a statement of
his or her rights in a simplified fashion." 8 2 In this respect, the Court
stated:
...[T]he record established that the interrogating officer read the
defendant his rights from the standard adult Miranda form. The officer did not explain any of the rights, nor did he discuss [with the
fifteen year old] .. .the possibility of his being tried as an adult for

armed robbery. Accordingly,
on remand for retrial the confession
83
should be suppressed.
As a result, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded:
[B]efore a juvenile can be deemed to have voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived his or her fundamental constitututional rights ...
he or she must be informed, in languageunderstandableto a child, of his or her
,ights...84
V.

SUMMARY

In light of the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that depending
on the specific jurisdiction, appellate resolution of the introductory
hypothetical could be decided either way. If the officer advised S.D.
of his Miranda rights and included an explanation of each in terms
the youth could comprehend, the confession would, given the other
findings of the juvenile court judge, undoubtedly be admissible in
all jurisdictions.8 5 Moreover, if the officer had access to, and utilized, a carefully constructed "Youth Rights Form" which set forth
the Miranda warnings with accompanying simplified explanations,
his testimony naturally would be bolstered by this corroborating
piece of documentary evidence. Without such a form, the officer is
left with the standard adult Miranda exposition and any creativity he
can muster at the time if creative at the time he so feels.
education; and (6) his very limited prior experience with the criminal justice system. Id.
at 378-79.
81 490 A.2d 295 (N.H. 1985).
82 Id. at 304.
83

Id. The officer testified that he at no time made any attempt to explain any of the

Miranda warnings, but merely asked the fifteen-year-old if he understood them. Id. at

298.
84

Id. at 304 (emphasis added). In addition to the simplified explanation of rights,

inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement is also necessary for the ultimate determination that the waiver was made voluntarily, intelligently,
and with full knowledge of the consequences. One such circumstance includes a determination of whether the juvenile was informed of the possibility and consequences of
standing trial as an adult criminal. Id. at 302, 304.
85 This assumes the presence of a parent or interested adult for jurisdictions which
so require.
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PRESENTATION OF THE YOUTH RIGHTS FORM

INTRODUCTION

As Justice Douglas of the New Hampshire Supreme Court
stated, ". . . because accused citizens must understand their rights in
order to effectuate a valid waiver, the greatest care must be taken to

assure that children fully understand the substance and significance
8
of their rights."

6

In 1980, Thomas Grisso undertook an empirical study to determine the ability ofjuveniles to comprehend the meaning and significance of their Miranda rights.8 7

He found that juveniles under

fifteen years of age do not adequately comprehend the formal Miranda warnings;8 8 30% to 50% of the fifteen-year-olds tested did not
adequately understand the formal Miranda warnings;8 9 55.3% of all
the children tested demonstrated deficient understanding of at least
one of the formal warnings; 90 63.3% misunderstood at least one of
the crucial words used in the standard Miranda form; 9 ' and only
20% of all the youths tested demonstrated an adequate understand92
ing of the entire set of formal Miranda warnings.

Little information, however, is available on the efficacy of administering a simplified set of Miranda warnings to juveniles. One
study indicates that younger or less experienced youths respond fa-

vorably to a simplified Miranda form. 93 This study concludes that
the great majority of juveniles "should be advised and counseled
86 Benoit, 126 N.H. at 18, 490 A.2d at 304.
87 Grisso, supra note 10. The method employed by Grisso required the development
of "objective, reliable methods for measuring comprehension." Id. at 1143. The methods encompassed the measurement of two indicia of comprehension: first, whether the
youth understands the words and phrases employed in the standard Miranda form, and
second, whether he or she accurately perceives the function and significance of the
rights conveyed in the warnings. Id. To facilitate the methods, two tests were administered: a "Vocab Test," which tested the research subjects' comprehension of words in
the formal Miranda warning, such as "consult," "attorney," "interrogation,' ' "appoint,"
"entitled," and "right"; and a "Rights Test," consisting of a questionnaire which asked
the research subject to paraphrase each Miranda warning. The responses were then assigned to a particular scoring criterion, and the results were correlated.
88 Id. at 1160.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1153-54.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1153. See also Grisso & Pomicter, supra note 12, at 339 (in which an empirical
study indicated that, overall, only 9-11% of the juveniles interrogated refused to waive
their rights to avoid potential self-incrimination, as contrasted with a study of adult
interrogation in which 40% refused to waive their rights). But see supra notes 11 and 41
and accompanying text (suggesting that few adult laymen fully comprehend the nature
and extent of the consequences of waiving their rights).
93 Furguson and Douglas, supra note 12.
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carefully if they are to understand their rights competently. '

94

It is,

however, specifically noted in the study that the simplified Miranda
form used failed to significantly increase understanding. 9 5 One of
the problems with the study, according to Furguson and Douglas, is
96
that the simplified form may be inadequate.
In 1985, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire offered a more
comprehensive form for New Hampshire juvenile officers and police. 9 7 Its effectiveness, however, remains to be seen. More importantly, the court declared that the failure to use the simplified form
results in a presumption of inadequate explanation of the juvenile's
rights.9 8
B.

METHODOLOGY

As a preliminary step, a simplified version of the Miranda warnings was constructed using each formal warning followed by a simplified version or explanation of the formal warning. This version
was constructed by synthesizing the model used by the Benoit
Court 99 and the Ferguson and Douglas model.1 0 0
The resulting version was then tested by interviewing twentyfive juveniles taken into custody for various offenses at the Atlantic
City Police Department's Juvenile Bureau. The responses and experiences gained from the initial interviews formed the basis for further modification of the Youth Rights Form.10 1 The Form was then
94 Id. at 54.

95 The Furguson and Douglas "Simplified Warning" devised for the purpose of their
study stated:
You don't have to talk to me at all, now or later on, it is up to you. If you decide to
talk to me, I can go to court and repeat what you say, against you. If you want a
lawyer, an attorney, to help you to decide what to do, you can have one free before
and during questioning by me now or by anyone else later on. Do you want me to
explain or repeat anything about what I have just told you? Remembering what I
have just told you, do you want to talk to me?
Id. at 40.
96 Id. Although it is difficult to speculate as to why Furguson and Douglas believed
their form to be inadequate, it is the author's belief that their form is too simple. Such
oversimplification has necessarily subtracted the extended explanation of each warning
which the author has found to be critical to the child's comprehension.
97 See Benoit, 126 N.H. 22, 490 A.2d at 306-307.
98 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 80 and 97.
100 See supra note 95.
101 Each youth was first read the formal Miranda warnings and asked whether he or
she understood the warnings. If the answer was no, the youth was then read the modified form. Nine of the juveniles interviewed responded by saying they did not fully understand the formal warning. After being read their rights from the modified form, all
nine responded by saying that they now understand. If the answer was yes, the youth
was asked to explain what each warning meant. The varying responses aided in the
further revision of the Youth Rights Form. Of the sixteen youths who responded by saying
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presented to a juvenile court judge of the New Jersey Superior
Court, Family Division, 102 and, after consultation, was modified
further.
The next step involved sending the Youth Rights Form to
twenty law-enforcement agencies across the United States requesting that officials who have day-to-day contacts with juvenile offenders insert their comments, changes, and modifications for further
revision and refinement of each warning. The comments, changes,
and modifications received reflected the collective personal experiences of professional law enforcement officials presently active in
the field of juvenile justice. Moreover, many of the responses included insertions depicting simplified Miranda warning explanations
the particular responding official had found to be most effective.
The final step involved the synthesis of all the recommendations received into a comprehensive, readily understandable document: The
10 3
Youth Rights Form.
that they understood the formal warnings, only three were able to fully explain the significance of each warning.
Before any of the juveniles were read the modifed version, each was asked, after the
reading of the standard adult Miranda form, whether they thought they must speak to
the police. Seven of the juveniles felt that speaking to the police was mandatory, believing that a failure to do so would result in some sort of punishment; three felt that it was a
gcod idea, believing that speaking would expedite their release; five gave equivocal responses; and ten indicated that they knew that they did not have to speak to the police.
After reading the modified form, only three of the youths still believed that speaking to
the police was required-two who originally thought speaking was mandatory to avoid
punishment, and one who originally thought that speaking to the police would expedite
his release.
102 Judge Steven Perskie of the New Jersey Superior Court, Family Division, who, in
an average week, will hear approximatley 50 juvenile delinquency proceedings.
103 Naturally, the efficacy of the Youth Rights Form remains to be seen. Further empirical research incorporating its use is highly encouraged. The author would like to
express his gratitude to the Honorable Steven Perskie, Judge, New Jersey Superior
Court, Family Division; Northfield Defense Attorney, D. William Subin (formerly Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of NewJersey and Police Legal Advisor for the County
of Atlantic); and the following law enforcement professionals for their time and invaluable contribution to the formation of the Youth Rights Form: Denise Clayton, Juvenile
Detention Manager, Philadelphia Human Services, Youth Study Center, Philadelphia,
PA.; George B. Collins III, Chief Probation Officer, Juvenile Court Fulton County, Atlanta, Georgia; Harold Kaufman, Investigator Sergeant, Atlantic County Major Crimes
Squad, Atlantic County, New Jersey; James Kelly, Juvenile Police Detective, Atlantic City
Police Department, Atlantic City, New Jersey; Carol Anne Krementz, Juvenile Police
Detective, Vineland Police Department, Vineland, New Jersey; Anthony P. Librizzi,
Detective Lieutenant, Ventnor Police Department, Ventnor, New Jersey; Patrick
Madamba,Juvenile Police Detective, Atlantic City Police Department, Atlantic City, New
Jersey; Charles M. Morvay, Principal Probation Officer (t/a), Atlantic County, New
Jersey; Leslie E. Nolan, Youth Detention Counselor, Philadelphia Human Resources,
Youth Study Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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APPENDIX
YOUTH RIGHTS FORM
Youth in custody:
Place:
Day of week:
Time this form was read: _.

Age:

. DOB:

__

Date:
Time child taken into custody:
Official:

Parent (Guardian or Custodian) present:
[If other than parent, indicate relationship.]
Parent (Guardian or Custodan) not present.
Unable to contact after
[Check]
attempts [See last page for times and places of contact attempts.];
[Number]
or,

contact made, unwilling to attend.

_

[Check]
[The following must be read and explained by the officer, and, the youth
(and parent, guardian, or custodian) shall read it before signing.]
Before I am allowed to ask you any questions, you must understand that you have certain important rights, or protections, that have been given to you by our laws in these
situations. These rights will make sure that you will be treated fairly. You will not be
punished for deciding to use these rights. I will read these rights to you, and explain
each of them to you if you don't understand them, or think you may not understand
them. You may ask questions as we go along so that you can completely understand
what your rights are.
Do you understand me so far ?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)

I.

. No
. No

You have the right to remain silent or the right to talk to us about this matter. This
means that you do not have to write or say anything; not with me or anyone else, not
now or later on. You will not be punished for deciding not to talk to us.
Do you understand this right ?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)

2.

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

. No
. No

If you give up your right to remain silent, anything you say can be and may be used
against you in court. This means that if you decide to talk to me or answer questions, I can go to court and tell the judge what you said. This also means that if you
say or write anything, what you say or write can be used in a court to prove that you
may have broken the law.
Do you understand this ?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)

Yes
Yes _.

. No
No

[Note: The following provision has been included for those jurisdictions which include the presence of a parent or interested adult as a prerequisite to any constitutional questioning of a juvenile.]
2a. You have the right to have your parent, guardian, or custodian present here
with you before we talk to you or ask you any questions. This means that
before we ask you anything about this matter, you can, and should, call your
parents (guardian or custodian) so they can be here with you to help you.
Do you understand this ight ?

Yes

_

. No

554
3.

You have a right to talk to an attorney, a lawyer, before any questioning. You have
the right to have the lawyer here with you while you are being questioned. The
lawyer will help you. If you decide that you want a lawyer, we will not question you
or talk to you at all until you speak to the lawyer.
Do you understand this right ?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)

4.

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
No

If you want to talk to a lawyer and you and your family do not have the money to pay
for one, you can still have a lawyer for free before any questioning about this matter
begins.
Do you understand this right ?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)

6.

No
No

You have the right to stop talking to us at any time. You also have the right to ask
for a lawyer to be here with you at any time. This means that if you decide, at any
time during questioning, that you do not want to talk any more, you may tell us to
stop and we will not ask you any more questions. Also, if you decide you would like
to talk to a lawyer at any time during questioning, you will not be asked any more
questions until a lawyer is here with you and you have talked with him.
Do you understand this right ?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)

5.
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Yes

No

Yes

No

[Forserious crimes only] There is a possibility that you may not be brought to juvenile

court, but, instead, will be treated as an adult in an adult criminal court. If that
happens, the procedures- the way your case will be handled- will be different.
However, you will still keep and have all the rights I have explained to you. You
must also understand that anything you may say to me by talking with me or answering my questions could be used to decide whether you are treated as a juvenile or as
an adult. If you are to be treated as an adult, we, or the court, will explain the adult
procedures and results which could include jail or prison if you are found guilty.
Do you understand this right ?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)
7.

Yes
Yes

No
No

You must always understand that if you decide to exercise or use any or all of your
rights, you will not be hurt or punished in any way at all. These are your rights and
my rights and our laws given them to you and I in the same way.
Yes
Yes

Do you have any questions so far?
Parent (Guardian or Custodian)

No
No

If yes (nature of question):

[The Official should make sure the following portion is read by the youth.]
8.

I can read and understand English.
I go to school.

No _

Yes
. Yes _

_.No
; Present Grade
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APPENDIX
ATTORNEY REQUEST
After listening to my rights and reading my rights, I fully understand what my rights
are. At this time I would like to have a lawyer.
Signature of Youth:
Signature of Parent (Guardian or Custodian):
Signature of Official:

. Date

Time

_

.

GUARDIAN OR CUSTODIAN
EXPLAIN NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP AND SOURCE OF THE GUARDIAN'S
OR CUSTODIAN'S AUTHORITY TO "GUIDE" OR "COUNSEL" THE YOUTH IN
THIS CASE, AND, WHETHER THE GUARDIAN OR CUSTODIAN HAS "LEGAL
CUSTODY" OF THE YOUTH.

WAIVER
I have been read and I have read my rights as listed above. I fully understand what my
rights are. I am willing to give up my right to remain silent. I am willing to answer
questions. I give up my right to have a lawyer present. I do not wish to speak to a
lawyer before I answer any questions. No promises or threats or special offers have
been made to me to make me give up my rights. I understand that I may change my
mind at any time and say that I want to use my rights. I also understand that if I change
my mind, it will not effect what I have already said or done.
Signature of Youth:
Signature of Parent (Guardian or Custodian):
Witness [Type or Print]:
Signature of Witness:
Official's Name [Type or Print]:
Signature of Official:

Telephone:
Date:
Time:

_
_

.
.

556

LARRY E. HOLTZ

[Vol. 78

DOCUMENTATION OF OFFICIAL ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT PARENT
(GUARDIAN OR CUSTODIAN) OF YOUTH
Date:

. Time:

Method:
Response:

Date:

Time:

Method:
Response:

Date:

Time:

Method:
Response:

Date:

. Time:

Method:
Response:

Date:

Method:
Response:

Time:

